This link goes to a Reuters article on the recent electoral victory of Italy's Silvio Berlusconi.
I'm not particularly interested in modern Italian politics, but I couldn't help noticing that a "bigger than expected swing" to his "centre right" position and a "strong mandate" to govern Italy and "the European Union's fourth largest economy" were met in a rather strange way.
Rather than speak of conservation of the social or legal system, or instead reform them in meaningful ways, Berlusconi, soon to be the leader of one of the world's largest nations, has declared that he is "preparing a government ready to last five years."
Now, I may not be a world leader or even a world leader-elect, but I think it's really pathetic that we've gone from presidents and even kings who thought in terms of decades or even centuries to a ruler myopic enough to be satisfied with his country's momentary survival.
I could understand his complacency if life was going great, and there were no legal or structural concerns that demanded the attention of the government. (Or, in the more likely case, concerns that demanded the cessation of the government's attention) But in his own words, Berlusconi admits that "The months and years ahead will be difficult", and, according to Reuters, Italians doubt any government's ability to "cure the ills" of the country's economy.
I'm not calling for increased government intervention. I am calling for people who run the country to think outside the time-frame of the next election or the next finance report and govern in ways that serve the long-term interests of the people, both here in America and around the world.
edit: apparently the article and/or link has been changed, so it links to a newer article on Berlusconi. If I can find one I'll link to it.
edit 2: I've found a new link and updated mine, so it should be the correct article, at least for now.
15 April, 2008
30 November, 2007
The Bernanke Rationalization
Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, appeared on CNBC a couple weeks ago (youTube clip here). At around 5:04-5:16, in the middle of a heated discussion of inflation, Bernanke claimed that an American who has their wealth in dollars, and and spends in dollars, sees no negative effect except for an increase in import prices. Setting aside as irrelevant to Bernanke's comment the fact that the U.S. imports massive amounts of goods, and setting aside as irrelevant the fact that even a modest increase in import prices has effects throughout the economic system as a whole, I wish to consider for a moment the merit of Chairman Bernanke's statement.
The statement has deep errors on a conceptual basis. The first, and most obvious, is that a discussion on inflation cannot be reduced to currency exchange without obscuring a great many domestic details. By implying that inflation has no consequences, Chairman Bernanke is committing what must be termed an evasion. The Chairman comes to the Federal Reserve from an academic background in economics, so we cannot assume that his statements stem from ignorance. Rather, it seems as if the Chairman is willing to dismiss the chief harm (sometimes confused as the definition) of inflation: rising domestic prices. It is ironic that Chairman Bernanke could refer to domestic prices repeatedly, but ignore them when discussing the issue in detail.
Watch the video, and pay careful attention to the Chairman's wording. He says that the only effect of a decline in the dollar's value on a person's buying power is to affect the price of imported goods. A decline in the dollar's value is synonymous with a decline in buying power. Whether we consider this a domestic decline, in the classical understanding of inflation, or an international decline as Bernanke implies, the result is the same. A decline is the dollar's value has no meaning, conceptually, or perhaps even grammatically, except as a decline in buying power. Value, as an economic concept, pertains either to the utility an individual gains from ownership, or to trade value (to be exchanged for an object of greater utility). Because money is valued almost exclusively as a means of exchange, the value of money means the money's value in trade. This value is the buying power of the currency in question. From a simple, grammatical understanding like this, it becomes apparent that Bernanke's attempt to disconnect the two phrases is ultimately doomed as an attempt to maintain a contradiction. Unfortunately for Chairman Bernanke, reality, of which the economic system is a part, does not tolerate contradictions.
The statement has deep errors on a conceptual basis. The first, and most obvious, is that a discussion on inflation cannot be reduced to currency exchange without obscuring a great many domestic details. By implying that inflation has no consequences, Chairman Bernanke is committing what must be termed an evasion. The Chairman comes to the Federal Reserve from an academic background in economics, so we cannot assume that his statements stem from ignorance. Rather, it seems as if the Chairman is willing to dismiss the chief harm (sometimes confused as the definition) of inflation: rising domestic prices. It is ironic that Chairman Bernanke could refer to domestic prices repeatedly, but ignore them when discussing the issue in detail.
Watch the video, and pay careful attention to the Chairman's wording. He says that the only effect of a decline in the dollar's value on a person's buying power is to affect the price of imported goods. A decline in the dollar's value is synonymous with a decline in buying power. Whether we consider this a domestic decline, in the classical understanding of inflation, or an international decline as Bernanke implies, the result is the same. A decline is the dollar's value has no meaning, conceptually, or perhaps even grammatically, except as a decline in buying power. Value, as an economic concept, pertains either to the utility an individual gains from ownership, or to trade value (to be exchanged for an object of greater utility). Because money is valued almost exclusively as a means of exchange, the value of money means the money's value in trade. This value is the buying power of the currency in question. From a simple, grammatical understanding like this, it becomes apparent that Bernanke's attempt to disconnect the two phrases is ultimately doomed as an attempt to maintain a contradiction. Unfortunately for Chairman Bernanke, reality, of which the economic system is a part, does not tolerate contradictions.
19 November, 2007
Questioning Intellectual Property Rights
George Reisman, whose excellent blog can be found here, has in the post I've linked to made a number of confusions, using them to support, rather tenuously, intellectual property rights. I am not in the pursuit of depriving anyone of the fruits of their labor, but I think that intellectual property rights per se can (and probably do) go too far.
To sum up two of the points from the article:
2. It follows from the widespread existence of identity theft that identities are property.
3. Identities aren't physical people, so they must be intellectual property.
I will address these separately and briefly.
2) Identity theft is misnamed. Identity fraud would be much more appropriate. People don't permanently steal someone's identity, depriving them of its use (except in rare cases in which fraud is so overwhelming that a new identity must be created). What is stolen is not the identity, but by fraud, physical property. No one has a right to their identity per se, they have a right to the physical goods provided by that physical person and guaranteed by the identity, such as money held in bank accounts.
3) Identities are not property at all, because they are not physical property. Reisman assumes that property can be divorced from physical form entirely. The symbols and other non-tangible assets that were originally created always referred to physical property (actually, the original bank notes and checks referred specifically to precious metals). Claiming that property can include symbols divorced from physical goods entirely seems to me suspiciously similar to claiming that money can be divorced from physical value. After all, if symbols are property, then it makes sense to say that symbols have value. In other words, it would make sense to claim that fiat money is valuable because it is a symbol of actual money. We know this not to be the case.
To sum up two of the points from the article:
2. It follows from the widespread existence of identity theft that identities are property.
3. Identities aren't physical people, so they must be intellectual property.
I will address these separately and briefly.
2) Identity theft is misnamed. Identity fraud would be much more appropriate. People don't permanently steal someone's identity, depriving them of its use (except in rare cases in which fraud is so overwhelming that a new identity must be created). What is stolen is not the identity, but by fraud, physical property. No one has a right to their identity per se, they have a right to the physical goods provided by that physical person and guaranteed by the identity, such as money held in bank accounts.
3) Identities are not property at all, because they are not physical property. Reisman assumes that property can be divorced from physical form entirely. The symbols and other non-tangible assets that were originally created always referred to physical property (actually, the original bank notes and checks referred specifically to precious metals). Claiming that property can include symbols divorced from physical goods entirely seems to me suspiciously similar to claiming that money can be divorced from physical value. After all, if symbols are property, then it makes sense to say that symbols have value. In other words, it would make sense to claim that fiat money is valuable because it is a symbol of actual money. We know this not to be the case.
02 November, 2007
Left Economic Theory and Rape
I was reading an article by Tibor Machan ("Power and Liberalism", available here) when I saw something interesting, in the midst of a general, almost generic analysis of Rawlesian-style distribution theory and, more specifically, Marxist economic theory. In the essay he made an claim that is very influential among ethical egoists: genetic and other inherited factors are not earned, but nevertheless cannot and should not be split or distributed in any way by force of government.
A bit of deeply original thought, at least on the rhetorical level, was particularly noticeable. He argues that appropriation of any factory from its owners, say, because they didn't earn it, and governing it in the workers' interest is irrational. He uses a brilliant analogy of a beautiful woman, who has little part in actually earning her beauty, and enjoys the benefits of her beauty, including substantial power in terms of relationships. Machan claims that even though she has this power (like, say, an employer might have over a day laborer), she should still retain control of it.
I was thinking about Machan's line of analogy and argument, and I realized that the mere ownership of a vagina gives a woman considerable power over sexual activity, especially in a society that recognizes a woman's right to consent or to refuse to consent to sexual activity. According to the Marxist theory whereby the economic power an employer has in employing a worker necessarily requires state intervention on behalf of the worker, the state should continuously intervene to make women provide sexual services for aroused men. According to the Marxist theory whereby the poor should rise up and appropriate economic power directly, men should have free reign to rape any woman they choose.
There is, of course, a caveat to this analogy, in that the Marxist will claim, in addition to the economic-power argument (vaginas give power) and the non-desert argument (women don't earn their vaginas), that the oppressive social classes exploit the deserving labor classes. This is easily resolved. A good student of society will point out that women use their power over sex to gain marriage, where they are generally considered to have a right to half the man's earnings without necessarily contributing anything economically.
This argument, while relying on Marxist thought, lies completely counter to feminist-Marxist thought. According to them, men are the exploiters of women (for instance, by not paying their wives for sexual services, as if marriage were merely an excuse to repeatedly solicit the services of a prostitute). According to feminist-Marxists, it is economic power that projects itself into sexual relations, rather than the other way around.
The problem is that both variants of sexual Marxism are wrong. Rather, people voluntarily choose to get married and/or have sex, and refusal to do so constitutes a perfectly valid exercise of free will.
In economic terms: People voluntarily seek and/or provide employment, and refusal to do so constitutes a perfectly valid exercise of free will.
A bit of deeply original thought, at least on the rhetorical level, was particularly noticeable. He argues that appropriation of any factory from its owners, say, because they didn't earn it, and governing it in the workers' interest is irrational. He uses a brilliant analogy of a beautiful woman, who has little part in actually earning her beauty, and enjoys the benefits of her beauty, including substantial power in terms of relationships. Machan claims that even though she has this power (like, say, an employer might have over a day laborer), she should still retain control of it.
I was thinking about Machan's line of analogy and argument, and I realized that the mere ownership of a vagina gives a woman considerable power over sexual activity, especially in a society that recognizes a woman's right to consent or to refuse to consent to sexual activity. According to the Marxist theory whereby the economic power an employer has in employing a worker necessarily requires state intervention on behalf of the worker, the state should continuously intervene to make women provide sexual services for aroused men. According to the Marxist theory whereby the poor should rise up and appropriate economic power directly, men should have free reign to rape any woman they choose.
There is, of course, a caveat to this analogy, in that the Marxist will claim, in addition to the economic-power argument (vaginas give power) and the non-desert argument (women don't earn their vaginas), that the oppressive social classes exploit the deserving labor classes. This is easily resolved. A good student of society will point out that women use their power over sex to gain marriage, where they are generally considered to have a right to half the man's earnings without necessarily contributing anything economically.
This argument, while relying on Marxist thought, lies completely counter to feminist-Marxist thought. According to them, men are the exploiters of women (for instance, by not paying their wives for sexual services, as if marriage were merely an excuse to repeatedly solicit the services of a prostitute). According to feminist-Marxists, it is economic power that projects itself into sexual relations, rather than the other way around.
The problem is that both variants of sexual Marxism are wrong. Rather, people voluntarily choose to get married and/or have sex, and refusal to do so constitutes a perfectly valid exercise of free will.
In economic terms: People voluntarily seek and/or provide employment, and refusal to do so constitutes a perfectly valid exercise of free will.
26 June, 2007
Ur-Fascism Part I
I've been reading Umberto Eco's article, Ur-Fascism, in which he attempts to identify 14 different traits essential to Fascism removed from its local and incidental coloring. (He calls such a political system Ur-Fascism, or eternal fascism.) The first trait he claims is traditionalism. He says that fascism adopts various and sometimes contradictory elements of different traditions or beliefs. The effect of this is that "there can be no advancement of learning. Truth has been already spelled out once and for all, and we can only keep interpreting its obscure message."
Fascism takes a step beyond religious fundamentalism in this approach. Everyday theocratic fundamentalism is vanilla compared to fascism, which seeks not to impose faith by force, but to impose force on the basis of faith. Whatever your beliefs, fascism takes the existence of faith as a basis of some sort of primitive knowledge beyond human comprehension, and without specifying what this knowledge states, proceeds to impose rule by force. The totality of a belief system is not relevant. What is relevant is that fascism postures itself as the logical successor to religious and other traditional belief systems. Fascism quite possibly the exact opposite of libertarianism. While pressure-group warfare is based on groups convincing government to serve their interests, fascism is divorced from the possibility of convincing anyone of anything. In its religious aspects, at least, fascism enforces faith as it pleases. So long as the principle is established that the fascist government is to do the enforcing, fascism cares fairly little what it enforces. This explains why Germany was fascist and socialist and Italy was fascist and anti-socialist. This is also why Mussolini's Italy was perhaps the only country ever to proudly take the title of Totalitarian. While Italian fascism never had a strong philosophical base, it did take pride in its power.
We can see an alarmingly similar trend in the modern US. While neither party is openly syncretistic, the right's religious fundamentalism and American traditionalism are fascist when combined with the left's cultural marxism. (One of the original sources addressing cultural marxism is this speech by Bill Lind.) With every step towards the unification of America's major two parties, we are drawn closer to naked fascism. The modern regime of faith is the regime of fascism.
Fascism takes a step beyond religious fundamentalism in this approach. Everyday theocratic fundamentalism is vanilla compared to fascism, which seeks not to impose faith by force, but to impose force on the basis of faith. Whatever your beliefs, fascism takes the existence of faith as a basis of some sort of primitive knowledge beyond human comprehension, and without specifying what this knowledge states, proceeds to impose rule by force. The totality of a belief system is not relevant. What is relevant is that fascism postures itself as the logical successor to religious and other traditional belief systems. Fascism quite possibly the exact opposite of libertarianism. While pressure-group warfare is based on groups convincing government to serve their interests, fascism is divorced from the possibility of convincing anyone of anything. In its religious aspects, at least, fascism enforces faith as it pleases. So long as the principle is established that the fascist government is to do the enforcing, fascism cares fairly little what it enforces. This explains why Germany was fascist and socialist and Italy was fascist and anti-socialist. This is also why Mussolini's Italy was perhaps the only country ever to proudly take the title of Totalitarian. While Italian fascism never had a strong philosophical base, it did take pride in its power.
We can see an alarmingly similar trend in the modern US. While neither party is openly syncretistic, the right's religious fundamentalism and American traditionalism are fascist when combined with the left's cultural marxism. (One of the original sources addressing cultural marxism is this speech by Bill Lind.) With every step towards the unification of America's major two parties, we are drawn closer to naked fascism. The modern regime of faith is the regime of fascism.
18 June, 2007
The Nature of Government
The chief trait of government is that it uses force. Therefore any analysis of government must seek to understand how the state acquires the right to use force. I will not delve into ethics here, except to say that it is wrong for one individual to use force against another, except in self-defense. By extension, government (a group of individuals) must not use force except in defense. This is the essence of any libertarian politics.
There is an interesting debate between the Objectivists and the Anarcho-Capitalists, both generally considered libertarian in politics. The Objectivists claim that government must maintain a monopoly on the use of force, in order to act on behalf of citizens in self-defense. The Anarcho-Capitalists claim that such a monopoly represents the initiation of force, thereby contradicting the premise of the Objectivist argument, namely, that government must guard against the initiation of force. The Objectivist response is to point out that competing users of force (competing 'governments') allows for competing definitions of right and wrong uses of force, leading to a situation not unlike gang warfare. The Anarcho-Capitalists rightly realize that this does not refute their argument, and so the debate seems to have arrived at an impasse, a choice between two competing systems with neither at a real advantage.
Both groups misunderstand a major technical detail in this debate. That detail is the fact that government may allow competing users of force while maintaining a monopoly on the definition of retaliatory force. Such a monopoly is necessary to prevent users of force from violating citizens' rights, and is maintained not through initiating force but through responding to deviations from this definition (such as punishing those who jail accused criminals without trial or those who run 'protection' rackets). This system is partially in place in America today, where the rich and famous purchase security details and large public spaces (like malls) purchase security forces (rent-a-cop) to protect them against violations of the law. The only way in which government must exceed power over definition of retaliatory force is that it must enforce this definition. The definition Objectivism gives of government: "an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographical area" should be changed to "an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce a certain definition of the legitimate use of force." Such a definition emphasizes the courts (definition-shaping) over the police (definition-enforcing), which is proper to a free society in which government needs to perform a police function only to retaliate against illegitimate use of force.
In short, government maintains a 'monopoly' on force by punishing those who initiate the use of force, not by preemptively using force against those who might do so.
Edit: I realize that my conclusion here does not quite describe the perfect situation. Rather, an institution that declares its intent to enforce a different definition of the use of force than the government's definition, is obviously subject to some sort of action in the same way that a man who announces his intention to murder or rob his fellows is subject to action.
There is an interesting debate between the Objectivists and the Anarcho-Capitalists, both generally considered libertarian in politics. The Objectivists claim that government must maintain a monopoly on the use of force, in order to act on behalf of citizens in self-defense. The Anarcho-Capitalists claim that such a monopoly represents the initiation of force, thereby contradicting the premise of the Objectivist argument, namely, that government must guard against the initiation of force. The Objectivist response is to point out that competing users of force (competing 'governments') allows for competing definitions of right and wrong uses of force, leading to a situation not unlike gang warfare. The Anarcho-Capitalists rightly realize that this does not refute their argument, and so the debate seems to have arrived at an impasse, a choice between two competing systems with neither at a real advantage.
Both groups misunderstand a major technical detail in this debate. That detail is the fact that government may allow competing users of force while maintaining a monopoly on the definition of retaliatory force. Such a monopoly is necessary to prevent users of force from violating citizens' rights, and is maintained not through initiating force but through responding to deviations from this definition (such as punishing those who jail accused criminals without trial or those who run 'protection' rackets). This system is partially in place in America today, where the rich and famous purchase security details and large public spaces (like malls) purchase security forces (rent-a-cop) to protect them against violations of the law. The only way in which government must exceed power over definition of retaliatory force is that it must enforce this definition. The definition Objectivism gives of government: "an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographical area" should be changed to "an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce a certain definition of the legitimate use of force." Such a definition emphasizes the courts (definition-shaping) over the police (definition-enforcing), which is proper to a free society in which government needs to perform a police function only to retaliate against illegitimate use of force.
In short, government maintains a 'monopoly' on force by punishing those who initiate the use of force, not by preemptively using force against those who might do so.
Edit: I realize that my conclusion here does not quite describe the perfect situation. Rather, an institution that declares its intent to enforce a different definition of the use of force than the government's definition, is obviously subject to some sort of action in the same way that a man who announces his intention to murder or rob his fellows is subject to action.
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